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Abstract
Organizations often use awards to incentivize performance. We design a field ex-
periment to unbundle the mechanisms through which awards may affect behavior: by
facilitating social comparison and by conferring recognition and visibility. In a nation-
wide health worker training program in Zambia, employer recognition and social visi-
bility increase performance while social comparison reduces it, especially for low-ability
trainees. These effects appear when treatments are announced and persist through
training. The findings are consistent with a model of optimal expectations in which
low-ability individuals exert low effort in order to avoid information about their relative
ability.
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1 Introduction
What are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of human
life which we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to,
to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all
the advantages which we can propose to derive from it.
—Adam Smith, “Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction
of Ranks,” The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)
The innate human desire for approbation might make status awards a cost-effective tool
to incentivize good performance (Besley & Ghatak, 2008; Moldovanu et al. , 2007). Awards
can motivate employees to exert effort in order to gain recognition and visibility, both of
which are free for the employer to bestow but valuable to the employee. However, given that
awards derive their value from their scarcity, they inevitably facilitate social comparisons,
which might be demotivating to employees.1
Our goal in this paper is to “unbundle” awards—that is, to provide evidence on the
mechanisms that underlie their effectiveness and potential harm. We conduct a natural
field experiment to separately identify channels through which awards can affect behavior,
unbundling the effect of social comparison through the disclosure of rank information, from
the effect of employer recognition and social visibility.
We study the effect of awards in the context of a nationwide training program for health
workers in Zambia. Our agents are 314 health workers recruited from 162 rural communi-
ties and brought to professional school for a one-year training program aimed at teaching
community-based health care. After training, trainees will be employed by the Ministry of
Health and deployed to their communities of origin, where they will become the first point of
contact for health services. Incentivizing learning is key in this context because trainees have
no previous medical training; thus, the skills they learn will determine their effectiveness in
the field.2
1Lazear (1989) describes the tradeoff in relative performance evaluation: it could motivate employees
to work harder, but could also create an excessively competitive work environment and decrease employee
morale. Major et al. (1991)’s review of the literature in social psychology provides evidence on the de-
motivating effect of social comparisons. A related literature in management emphasizes the importance of
concealing relative performance information to improve employee motivation (Milkovich & Newman, 1996).
2A number of field experiments have evaluated the effect of financial incentives on student learning; the
evidence of their efficacy is mixed (Fryer, 2011; Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Kremer et al. , 2009; Leuven et al. ,
2010).
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During the training program, trainees take courses on several topics, on which they are
tested at baseline (at the beginning of the year) and at the end of each course. The field
experiment randomly allocates trainees to two broad classes of treatments (in addition to
control): those that only provide information on trainees’ relative performance, and those
that also offer awards. After each exam, trainees in the control group receive a letter from
the school reporting their absolute score and their value added over their baseline score for
the given course. Trainees in the “private social comparison” treatment (T1) receive the
same letter with added information on their rank in the class distribution of both absolute
score and value added measured as improvement from baseline. Trainees in the “public social
comparison” treatment (T2) receive the same letter as in the previous treatment as well as
the names of the top four performers in the class (top two by absolute score and top two by
value added).
The third and fourth treatments add awards to rank information. Awards are given to
the trainees with the top two scores and those with the top two most improved scores (from
baseline). The latter ensures that weaker trainees have a chance to win and are therefore
motivated by the award. In the “employer recognition award” treatment (T3), the top four
performers receive a congratulatory letter from the Ministry of Health. In the “social visibility
award” treatment (T4), one of the top four performers is randomly selected to be featured in
an interview, which is printed along with the candidate’s photo in a newsletter distributed
back to their community of origin. Under a linearity assumption the difference between each
of the award treatments and the “public social comparison” treatment isolates the effect of
awards from the effect of the social comparisons they inevitably create.
Our setting has three key features that make it ideal for the purpose of this experiment.
First, since trainees take four courses during the study period and treatments are announced
at the beginning of the first course, we can assess whether they change their behavior in
anticipation of receiving rank information and awards or only after these have been provided.
Second, during training, the performance of the health workers is measured by an institution
(the school) that is different from their employer (the Ministry), and the health workers are
physically removed from their home communities. This allows us to separate the effect of
information on relative performance (provided by the school) from that of the employer’s
recognition and from visibility to one’s social circle (the home community). In most settings,
the employer measures and provides information on performance, such that the provision of
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information necessarily entails some recognition. The fact that trainees are distant from their
communities is similarly useful, as no treatment other than the social visibility award can
be used to enhance visibility within their social circles. In most settings in which agents are
co-located with their social network, any treatment that reveals their rank in the distribution
could potentially be used to enhance visibility.
Third, performance in this setting is uni-dimensional (trainees are solely meant to attend
classes and study the topics on the syllabus), and thus not subject to a multitasking problem
in the face of additional incentives. Moreover, performance can be measured objectively and
precisely by test scores. Value added in test scores is a good measure of learning, as is
often the case when knowledge at baseline is very limited (Muralidharan & Sundararaman,
2011). Critically, we can show that in this context exam performance is correlated with
future performance in the field (Ashraf et al. , 2013a).
The analysis reveals that social comparison and awards have opposite effects on perfor-
mance. Compared to trainees in the control group, the “private social comparison” treatment
significantly reduces test scores by 0.31 standard deviations, and the “public social compari-
son” treatment reduces it by 0.38 standard deviations. Importantly, the two social compar-
ison treatments reduce performance as soon as they are announced—i.e. before trainees get
the first letter with their rank information. A likely explanation is that individuals value the
belief that they have high relative ability, and the anticipatory utility this provides. They
may thus prefer to exert low effort in order to decrease the informativeness of the ranking
signal. This is akin to refusing to take a medical test for a disease, so as to justify holding
an optimistic belief about one’s health status (Oster et al. , 2013), and is consistent with
the literature on belief utility and information avoidance Bénabou & Tirole (2002); Köszegi
(2002). In our context, the negative effect due to information avoidance seems to dominate
the potential positive effect of competition among trainees (Charness & Grosskopf, 2001;
Freeman & Gelber, 2010).3
Adding awards to rank information significantly improves performance. Compared to
trainees in the “public social comparison” treatment, mean scores of trainees in the “employer
recognition award” and “social visibility” treatments are 0.38 and 0.44 standard deviations
3The empirical evidence on the ex-post effect of providing rank information is markedly mixed. Tran &
Zeckhauser (2012), Azmat & Iriberri (2010), and Dur et al. (2013) show positive effects of rank information
on performance, while Bandiera et al. (2013) and Barankay (2012) find this information reduces productivity.
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higher, respectively. Recognition from one’s employer can increase performance if agents have
career concerns (Dewatripont et al. , 1999) or preferences for reciprocity (Fehr & Schmidt,
1999). The net effect of either type of award is nil: because the positive effects of employer
recognition and social visibility are nullified by the negative effect of providing information
on relative ranks, trainees in the two award treatments perform as well as trainees in control.4
Quantile treatment estimates show that both the negative effect of social comparison and
the positive effects of recognition and visibility are stronger on the left tail of the conditional
productivity distribution, and both are zero at the top two deciles. In line with this, we
also find that these negative and positive effects are stronger for low-ability trainees, and
zero for high-ability trainees, where ability is measured by baseline test score. The fact
that the negative effect of ranking is stronger for the weakest trainees is intuitive, as these
are more likely to receive a negative signal about their skills.5 That the positive effects of
recognition and visibility are also stronger for the weakest trainees may be due to the fact
that, since awards are given to trainees with the highest value added (the “most improved”),
those who start at the bottom have a better chance to win. That the effects are zero for
the top two deciles is consistent with the fact that scores are capped, such that the highest
performing trainees have little room for improvement. Evidence from settings with no cap on
performance suggests that, in contrast, awards are most effective at the top of the distribution
(Nalbantian & Schotter, 1997; Müller & Schotter, 2010; Bandiera et al. , 2013; Leuven et al.
, 2010).
An important implication of these findings is that, due to the negative effect of social
comparison, awards might increase the dispersion of performance by weakening the weakest.
In our setting, this may matter just as much as—and perhaps more than—mean effects.
Health workers wield considerable power to influence the utility of their patients, especially
for the worse (e.g., missed diagnoses, incorrectly dosed medications, wrong-site amputations).
Both because of the potential for harm and the government’s mandate to ensure equity of
services across populations, the distribution of performance during training in this field
experiment is crucial. The findings thus suggest caution in using mechanisms that facilitate
4This echoes the findings of Bandiera et al. (2013) who show the impact of receiving information on
relative rankings can offset the positive impact of monetary prizes. In their setting, however, the effect is
driven by changes in team composition.
5Tran & Zeckhauser (ibid.) find that private rank disclosure motivates high-ability more so than low-
ability trainees, whereas Azmat & Iriberri (ibid.) find uniformly positive effects across the distribution.
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interpersonal comparisons in contexts in which worsening performance at the bottom of the
distribution is costly. This is particularly important in the policy domains of public service
delivery, such as in health and education, where the use of awards is increasingly common
(Mathauer & Imhoff, 2006; Ashraf et al. , 2013b), but where distributional effects on agents’
performance could have severe welfare consequences for those they are serving.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context and the experiment.
Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 interprets the findings in light of optimal
expectations theory (Brunnermeier & Parker, 2005; Oster et al. , 2013). Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Context
In 2010, the Government of Zambia (GOZ) launched a national effort to create a new civil
service cadre called the Community Health Assistant (CHA). In the program’s first year,
GOZ sought to recruit, train, and deploy approximately 300 Community Health Assistants
across seven of Zambia’s nine provinces.6 Within these seven provinces, based on population
density, GOZ chose the 48 most rural of the 58 constituent districts, and across these,
GOZ identified 165 underserved communities, each with an average population of 3,500
individuals (Government of Zambia, 2011). From each community, the intention was to
recruit two Community Health Assistants. The recruitment and selection process occurred
at the community level, with on-the-ground implementation coordinated by district health
officials.7
In total, 314 individuals accepted GOZ’s training offer and moved to Ndola, Zambia’s
second-largest city, to join a newly established training school. The training program lasted
one year and was structured in a modular format (see Figure A.1).8 At the beginning of
6This is the first generation of community health workers trained by the Government of Zambia. Although
this paper does not evaluate the efficacy of community health workers, they have been shown to improve
health outcomes in randomized controlled trials in other countries (Baqui et al. , 2008; Bhandari et al. ,
2011; Spencer et al. , 2011).
7See Ashraf et al. (2013a) for details on the selection process of the Community Health Assistants.
8The training curriculum was designed in the months leading up to the training launch through a con-
sultative process led by the Zambian Ministry of Health, with input from health educators, clinicians, and
public health and development practitioners.
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the training, all trainees took a baseline exam which covered all the material that would
be subsequently taught during the training year. After each course, trainees took an exam
covering the material taught in that course.9 During this time, the trainees engaged only
in attending classes and studying for their exams. The training school was divided into five
classrooms, each accommodating roughly 60 trainees. The school was led by a principal and
staffed by ten full-time teachers. The trainees were not formally paid during the training
year, but their tuition and room and board were covered by the Ministry. In addition,
the participants were aware that wages upon completing training would be the same for
all CHAs, and that opportunities for promotion would be available. The program is thus
effectively training "on the job" and career concerns were likely at play.
Once deployed to the field, the CHAs were to routinely visit households and provide a
variety of home-based services: basic medical care to any sick persons, health education and
counseling, and referrals to nearby health facilities as needed. Two key features of the job
illuminate how critical the training period was to subsequent performance. First, CHAs were
expected to provide a very broad scope of health services to all age groups. Second, they
were to do so with a great deal of autonomy. In contrast to nurses, whose job it classically is
to implement a physician’s orders, and who typically are not trained to diagnose and treat
illnesses, the CHA is more like a physician, making decisions autonomously without direct
supervision. The human capital required to perform such varied activities is substantial, and
the one-year training was consequently critical.
2.2 Performance measurement
Since the trainees’ only task during training was to attend classes and study the material
taught therein, we measure performance by exam test scores. All exams were based on
multiple choice questions created by external medical advisors based on the content of the
official training textbook.10 Grading was done electronically by the research team. After
each course exam, each student’s completed exam was returned to him or her, along with
an answer key.
9Each course also had a “practical” component for which trainees visited field sites. Performance in this
component was not tested.
10Multiple choice questions are a standard question type on exams in Zambian secondary and tertiary
education.
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Several measures were taken to prevent cheating or gaming. First, all exams were admin-
istered under timed, proctored conditions. Second, each exam had four versions, in which the
order of the answer choices for each question was randomly varied. The exam versions were
distributed within a classroom in sequential fashion, such that no two neighboring trainees
had the same exam version. Even if they were alike, the exam version was indicated dis-
creetly in the lower corner of the exam, such that a student attempting to cheat by copying
a neighbor’s answers would have difficulty determining whether the neighbor’s exam version
was the same as hers.
2.3 Experimental design
We worked with the school administrators to randomly allocate trainees to five groups (one
control and four treatments) of approximately 60 individuals each, stratified by average
baseline exam score and other potential determinants of performance.11 To minimize con-
tamination across treatments, all trainees in a given treatment group were assigned to the
same classroom, and classrooms were kept together for the entire duration of the experiment
that lasted nine consecutive months. For each course, each classroom was co-taught by two
teachers. The teachers rotated and were assigned to different classrooms after each course,
using a schedule that was determined by the principal and by the researchers with the aim
of ensuring even coverage of teachers across classrooms. Teachers and trainees in all groups
used the same textbook that was developed by GOZ for the CHA training.
The experimental treatments are as follows (see Figure 1 for a schematic diagram). Af-
ter each exam, trainees in the control group receive a letter from the school reporting their
absolute score and their value added over their baseline sub-score for the relevant course
content after each exam (see Appendix Figure A.2). Trainees in the “private social com-
parison” treatment (T1) receive the same letter from the school with added information on
their rank in the distribution of both absolute score and value added (see Appendix Figure
A.3). Trainees in the “public social comparison” treatment (T2) receive the same letter from
the school with added information on their rank and the names of the top four performers
11We used the “T-min-max” method to balance the classrooms on gender, baseline exam score, any previous
health experience, employment status and district-level recruitment strategy (different districts advertised
the CHA position with different emphasess on social vs. private benefits as described in Ashraf et al.
(2013a)). For a discussion of this randomization method, see Bruhn & Mckenzie (2009).
8
in the class—that is, the top two by absolute score and the top two by value added (see
Appendix Figure A.4).12We include the “most improved” category based on theoretical and
empirical evidence that multiple prizes at different points in the distribution are more mo-
tivating across the distribution than a single prize (Moldovanu & Sela, 2001; Freeman &
Gelber, 2010; Dur et al. , 2013). Importantly, trainees did not know that they could have
won “value added” prizes when they took the baseline test, so there is no scope for gaming
by obtaining a low score at baseline.
Trainees in the “employer recognition award” treatment (T3) receive the same letter as
those in the “public social comparison” treatment, and, in addition, the top four performers
receive a congratulatory letter from the Ministry of Health, handwritten and signed by the
director of the department that runs the CHA program (see Appendix Figure A.5 for an
example). Trainees in the “social visibility award” treatment (T4) receive the same letter
as those in the “public social comparison” treatment, and, in addition, one of the top four
performers is randomly selected to be featured in an interview that is printed together with
the candidate’s photo in a newsletter that is distributed back to their community of origin
(see Appendix Figure A.6 for an example).
The timeline of the experiment is as follows. Trainees took four sequential courses during
the experimental period (covering 9.5 out of the 12 months of training) and sat exams at
the end of each course. Courses varied in duration from two weeks (course 2) to four months
(course 1). At the beginning of the first course, trainees were told about their treatments,
and a reminder was delivered towards the middle of the same course.
During the course of the training year, 6 of 314 (1.9%) trainees dropped out of the
program, in most cases because it was discovered that the trainee was pregnant, and the
school could not accommodate infants in the dormitories. These trainees were distributed
across four of the five treatment conditions (one in the control group, one in T2, three
in T3, and one in T4) and have been excluded from our analysis. Due to the very low
rate of attrition, any imbalance between treatment conditions arising from this attrition is
indistinguishable from random error.
12The design decision to make comparisons only at the very top public was done in consultation with
senior teachers who were concerned about severe demotivating effects of advertising the lowest performers.
Although ranking throughout the entire distribution is publicly displayed in many professional schools in
Zambia, there is no consensus on whether this is helpful or harmful.
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Trainees were told the content of the letters that they were to receive after each exam and,
in addition, trainees in the two awards treatments were shown sample employer recognition
letters and community newsletters. In an assessment given to all trainees after the first letter
was sent out, 79% of CHAs responded to the question, “How clear do you find the information
presented in the letters?,” with “very clear” and an additional 14% with “somewhat clear.”
Table 1 shows balance across the five groups on a number of variables including baseline
exam score, English exam score, gender, age, health experience and employment status. Only
3 out of 24 (12%) pairwise differences are different from zero at the 10% level, as expected
by chance.
3 Analysis
3.1 Methodology
During the experimental study period trainees attend four courses and take an exam at the
end of each. Trainees in all treatments take the same courses and complete the same exams
at the same time.
To evaluate treatment effects we estimate the following model using panel data at the
trainee-course level:
scoreic = α +
4∑
t=1
βtT
t
i + γBic +Xiδ + Iicη + εic (1)
where scoreic is trainee i’s test score in course c normalized by the mean and standard
deviation of test scores for the same course in the control group; treatment effects are thus
measured in standard deviation units. Bic is trainee i’s score in the baseline exam content for
course c that was administered at the start of the training program. The difference between
the “post” exam score and the baseline score is used to measure the value added that is
reported in the treatment letters and to rank trainees for the “most improved” awards. Xi
are individual characteristics that include all stratification variables as well as age and trainee
i’s test score for an English language test. Iic are teacher-specific traits such as teacher ratings
(as reported anonymously by the trainees) and expertise in the subject matter of course c.
Since all trainees take the same courses at the same time, different trainees have different
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teachers for the same course. The teacher rotation schedule was determined by the principal
and by the researchers with the aim of ensuring even coverage of teachers across classes.
Standard errors are clustered at the trainee level, as trainee-specific unobservables in
the error term create correlation within trainee. Since courses are of different durations
and trainees have more time to exert learning effort the longer the course is, we weight
observations by course duration.
The parameters βt measure the causal effect of treatment t vis-à-vis the control group
under the identifying assumption of no contamination across treatments. Contamination can
occur if the response to treatment j is affected by the knowledge that treatment k exists. For
instance, trainees might respond differently to being given information on relative rankings
if they know that other trainees are also getting employer recognition awards while they
are not. To minimize the risk of contamination, we allocate trainees in different treatments
to different classes and keep classes together for the duration of the experiment. Trainees
were told that other classrooms may receive different types of letters with their their exam
scores, as this was the pilot year of the government program and different classrooms were
trying different things. Trainees were not told that this was a research experiment, thus
mitigating potential experimenter demand effects. Reassuringly, no student ever complained
or raised the issue of different treatments for the entire duration of the experiment. Despite
these precautions, trainees in the non-award treatments could have come across the award
recognition letter and community newsletter given to trainees in other treatments. This,
however, could have occurred only after the awards were distributed—that is, after the first
test. To provide evidence on the practical relevance of contamination, we estimate equation
(1) using scores from the first exam only, which was taken before trainees could have seen
letters given to their colleagues in other treatments.
To separate the different mechanisms through which awards can affect performance, treat-
ments are designed to be cumulative so that the “public social comparisons” treatment (T2)
also contains information about relative ranks (T1), and the two awards treatments (T3
and T4) contain the same information as T2. Under the assumption that the effect of each
component does not interact with the effect of the others, the net effect of each additional
component can be identified by the appropriate linear combination of βt estimators. For
instance, the net effect of employer recognition is given by β3 − β2. We report all relevant
linear combinations at the foot of each table.
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3.2 Average treatment effects
Table 2 reports the estimates of equation (1). Test scores are normalized by the mean and
standard deviation of the control group for each test so that treatment effects are measured
in standard deviation units. Columns (1) and (2) estimate average treatment effects with
and without teacher characteristics (average teacher rating and whether at least one of the
teachers had specific expertise in the subject matter).
Three findings are of note. First, trainees in treatments 1 (private social comparison)
and 2 (public social comparison) perform significantly worse than trainees in the control
group. Estimates from the baseline specification in Column (1) show that giving private
information about relative rankings lowers performance by 0.31 standard deviations, while
rank information combined with a public list of the top four performers lowers performance by
0.38 standard deviations. By contrast, trainees in treatments 3 and 4, where top performers
receive awards either in the form of a letter from the Ministry of Health or a profile in the
organization’s newsletter, performed the same as trainees in the control group.
Importantly, since trainees can do very little other than studying during the program,
we can rule out that the drop in exam performance is associated with an increase of effort
devoted to other tasks. In addition, in Ashraf et al. (2013a) we find that low performance
on test scores during training is highly predictive of low performance in the field in CHA
work. This strongly suggests that, even if there were other tasks, there is no compensating
effort, either on other tasks during training or in later job performance that can make up
for negative performance during the training period.
Second, we can identify the net effect of each additional treatment component by dif-
ferencing out common elements under the independence assumption discussed above. This
exercise reveals that the difference between T2 and T1 is small and not statistically signifi-
cant, suggesting that making the list of top performers public does not motivate individuals
to work harder. This might be driven by the possibility that other trainees are not the nat-
ural peer group to whom these individuals compare themselves. Alternatively, given that in
T1, individual ranks were printed on a letter, top performers in T1 could have easily made
themselves known even if the list was not public.
Similarly, we can identify the effect of employer recognition and social visibility by differ-
encing out the effect of providing rank information. Column (1) shows that both mechanisms
have a strong positive effect on performance. The difference between T3 and T2 is 0.38 stan-
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dard deviations, whereas the difference between T4 and T2 is 0.44 standard deviations. Both
effects are precisely estimated.
Third, the estimated treatment effects are not sensitive to the inclusion of teacher controls
(i.e., average teacher rating in students’ evaluations and whether at least one of the teachers
had specific expertise in the subject matter). This allays the concern that differences among
treatments could be due to correlated unobservables at the class-course level. Since including
teacher controls reduces the sample as these were not collected for course 2, we use the
specification without teacher controls in what follows.
Taken together, the findings indicate that the three mechanisms described at the outset
of this paper are relevant in this setting, but their signs and magnitudes differ: social com-
parisons (whether private or public) weaken motivation whereas employer recognition and
social visibility strengthen it.13 Thus, depending on the size of these opposing effects in a
given context, the net effect of relative performance-based awards is uncertain.
3.3 Timing
Since treatments are announced at the beginning of course 1, we are able to identify whether
their effect differs before and after the first round of letters containing rank information
and awards are handed out. This test can help us shed light on why individuals change
their behavior in response to rank information. For instance, if individuals are uncertain
about the production function of test scores and use rank information to update on the
marginal return of their effort, we would expect them to respond differentially before and
after the information is provided. In contrast, if individuals know the production function
and intrinsically care about their performance rank, we would expect their responses to be
the same before and after.
To test whether responses vary before and after rank information is first disclosed, we
estimate equation (1) augmented by the interactions of all treatment indicators with an
indicator variable that takes value 0 for the first test (i.e. before treatment letters were
distributed) and 1 for the following tests. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 report the estimated
13It could be argued that social visibility (in our case, visibility in one’s home community) is a more
powerful motivator in this setting; indeed, while the estimated effects are similar, the underlying treatment
strength is different, as all top four performers receive the employer recognition award, whereas only one of
them is randomly selected for the social visibility award.
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treatment effects on performance in the first test and performance in the following tests,
respectively. Column (5) reports the p-value of the null hypothesis that these are equal.
The findings show that social comparisons, whether private or public, lead to a similar
reduction in performance in the first and subsequent tests. Thus, this effect cannot be driven
by “demotivation” in the traditional sense, or updating on the marginal return to effort,
since trainees’ performance dropped in anticipation of receiving rank information. Likewise,
the findings are at odds with the assumption that trainees have competitive preferences
(Charness & Grosskopf, 2001; Freeman & Gelber, 2010); otherwise, we should have observed
an increase in effort in anticipation of receiving rank information. In Section III, we describe
a model of optimal expectations that is consistent with this pattern, in which trainees choose
low effort (i.e., self-sabotage) to avoid rank information that delivers a signal about their
relative ability.
In addition, columns (3) and (4) cast doubt on the relevance of the concern that responses
to treatments 1 and 2 might be contaminated by the awareness of the other two treatments.
Indeed, we show that providing rank information with or without a public list of top per-
formers reduces performance by the same amount even before trainees in these treatments
were likely to have become aware of the other treatments.14
The findings also show that both the employer recognition award and the social visibility
award are effective at increasing performance conditional on rank information both before
and after the first exam. The effect of the recognition award becomes weaker after the first
exam, possibly because individuals revise their chance of winning downwards once the first
round of rank information is revealed. We do not, however, find a similar pattern with
respect to the social visibility award. We will return to this below when we allow responses
to differ by baseline ability levels.
3.4 Distributional effects
Awards are likely to affect individuals at different points in the performance distribution
differently, as the incentive power of awards should be stronger for those who have a greater
14It was of course possible for trainees in the award treatments to tell their colleagues in other treatments
before the first exam, and before the awards were distributed. However, these claims should have been more
credible and hence contamination stronger after the awards letters became potentially visible to all. The
fact that treatment effects are stable throughout courses casts doubt on this.
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chance of winning the award—in our case, more able trainees and those who have more
potential to improve. Similarly, the effect of social comparison is likely to depend on whether,
given their knowledge of their own ability and expectation about others’, individuals expects
to be ranked high or low.
To provide evidence on these distributional issues we estimate quantile treatment effects
at each decile. Figure 2 shows this graphically, and Appendix Table A.1 reports the regression
coefficients by decile. The estimated treatment effect at each decile is the difference in
conditional test score between two statistical trainees—one in the treatment group and one
in the control group—both positioned at the same decile of the distribution of test scores
within her group. Figure 2 shows that both the negative effect of relative rankings and the
positive effects of recognition and visibility are stronger on the left tail of the conditional
test score distribution, and they gradually diminish to zero at the top two deciles. Standard
errors reported in Appendix Table A.1 show that all effects are statistically different from
zero until the seventh decile. Taken together, these findings indicate that information on
relative ranks, with or without a public component, increases the dispersion of performance
by reducing performance on the left tail.
To provide further evidence on this issue, Table 3 allows treatments to have heterogeneous
effects by trainees’ ability, measured by their score in the baseline exam. The estimates show
that both the negative effect of relative rankings and the positive effects of recognition and
visibility are stronger for low-ability trainees and zero for high-ability trainees. The fact
that the negative effect of relative rankings is stronger for the weakest trainees is intuitive,
as these are more likely to receive a negative signal about their skills. That the positive
effects of recognition and visibility are also stronger for the weakest trainees is presumably
due to the fact that, since awards are given to trainees with the highest value added (the
“most improved”), those who start at the bottom have a better chance to win. That the
effects are zero for the top two deciles is consistent with the fact that scores are capped, such
that the very best trainees have little room for improvement.15
15Across the entire sample, mean absolute post-test score in the highest decile is 90.0% and in the second-
highest decile is 86.5%. The single highest absolute score across all exams was 96.1%. As our team, in
consultation with medical training experts, wrote the exams to ensure quality and precision, we purposely
included extremely difficult questions making scores of 100% very difficult. We thus take the evidence on
top decile scores as support of capping, although we cannot rule out that other effects (such as a lack of
desire to be singled out among peers, due to being taxed by expectations of assistance) may have also been
occurring at the top decile.
15
Finally, Appendix Table A.2 allows treatments to have heterogeneous effects by trainees’
ability and exam timing. This confirms that most effects are driven by trainees at the bottom
of the ability distribution and that, as discussed above, rank information leads to a similar
reduction in performance in the first and subsequent tests. The results also show some
evidence that the positive effect of awards becomes weaker after the first exam for trainees
in the bottom tercile while it becomes stronger for those in the middle tercile. These findings
should, however, be taken with caution as samples are small and tests have low power.
4 Interpretation
Our results suggest that the prospect of receiving information about one’s rank in the dis-
tribution makes trainees exert lower effort, whereas the possibility of receiving employer
recognition or improving one’s visibility in the community makes them exert higher effort.
In this section, we attempt to interpret these findings in a unified utility maximization
framework.
The fact that individuals put in more effort when it is announced that doing so might earn
them an award is intuitive. The main challenge is to explain why individuals, especially those
with low ability, reduce effort in the rank information treatments even before being told their
rank. A growing literature models the possibility that information lowers utility leading to
information avoidance, at the cost of taking worse decisions (Oster et al. , 2013; Brunnermeier
& Parker, 2005; Köszegi, 2006; Stone, 2004). In these models, agents choose their beliefs
optimally to maximize their lifetime utility, including an interim period of anticipatory utility
arising from the belief. This implies that individuals may take actions to avoid a precise
signal that has the potential to threaten their belief, for instance by choosing not to take a
medical test.
In our setting, all agents know their individual baseline test scores and are told their
individual exam scores in all treatment groups (including control). This, combined with the
fact that individulas have a relatively good sense of their own individual ability as they all
enter as adults, allows us to assume all that all individuals know their own ability. What
individuals do not know is the ability of others—a reasonable assumption in our setting
given that trainees entered the training school from an extremely diverse set of geographic
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and skill backgrounds. Realistically, individuals have a noisy expectation over their peers’
ability.
In this setting, rank information (as provided in all treatment groups but not in control)
increases the precision of the estimate of each individual’s expectation over his peers’ average
ability. This would not affect behavior in standard models where agents only care about
the expected value, but it might matter if agents prefer a fuzzy signal which can support
optimistic beliefs about their relative ability.
We assume that agents are risk neutral and individual i with ability level ai chooses effort
ei to maximize his expected utility:
βti t(ai, ei) + β
sc
i (ai − a∗−i)(1 + T sci σ(ei)) + βai TAi p(ai, ei,bi)A− d(ei) (2)
The first term captures the effect of effort on learning proxied by test scores, which
might provide utility either directly as individuals care about learning or through future
wages. βti > 0 is the weight individual i puts on learning, and learning is a function of effort
and ability with te > 0, ta > 0, tee < 0. We assume that individuals know their own ability,
as, again, individuals know their baseline scores and their absolute test scores in control and
treatment alike.
The second term captures the utility deriving from social comparisons to which individual
i gives weight βsci > 0. Social comparisons enter additively as in Kandel & Lazear (1992)
and we assume that individuals care about being of higher ability than their peers rather
than having higher test scores per se. We assume that individuals enjoy social comparisons
when their own ability is higher than the average of their peers a∗−i, and the effect is larger
the larger is the ability gap. Conversely, individuals suffer from social comparisons when
their own ability is lower than the average of their peers, and the effect is larger the larger
is the ability gap.
Finally, as discussed above, we assume that when individuals are given information on
test score ranks, they can obtain more precise information about their relative ability. Thus,
T sci = 1 if individual i is in one of the four treatment groups that provide rank information
on test scores and 0 in control. In particular, we assume that whether test score ranks give
information on ability ranks depends positively on effort through the “signal” function σ(ei)
with σe > 0. Intuitively, since test scores are a function of ability and effort, receiving a low
rank when exerting low effort could still allow an individual to retain the option of believing
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that he is of truly high relative ability, but receiving a low rank with high effort could not.16
The “signal” function σ(ei) is a reduced form representation of “choosing beliefs” in the spirit
of Yariv (2002), Köszegi (2006), Oster et al. (2013) and Brunnermeier & Parker (2005).17
The third term captures the utility deriving from award A, which in our setting is either
employer’s recognition or social visibility. Thus, TAi = 1 if individual i is in one of the two
treatment groups that provide awards, and 0 otherwise. Note that TAi = 1 ⇒ T SCi = 1 but
not vice versa. The probability of winning the award p(ai, ei, bi) depends on effort, ability,
and the baseline score bi, with pe > 0, pee < 0, pa > 0, and pb < 0. The latter captures that
“most improved” awards are more easily obtainable by those who did poorly in the baseline
test.
Finally, d(e) is the disutility of effort, with de > 0, dee > 0 as is standard.
Maximizing equation (2) with respect to ei yields:
eCi s.t. β
t
i te(ai, e
c
i )− de(eci ) = 0 if TSCi = TAi = 0
eSCi s.t. β
t
i te(ai, e
SC
i ) + β
sc
i σe(e
SC
i )(ai − a∗−i)− de(eSCi ) = 0 if TSCi = 1, TAi = 0
eAi s.t. β
t
i te(ai, e
A
i ) + β
sc
i σe(e
A
i )(ai − a∗−i) + βai pe(ai, eAi, bi)A− de(eAi ) = 0 if TSCi = TAi = 1
The first order conditions for effort in the three cases inform the comparison of perfor-
mance in each treatment vs. the control group and across treatments. These comparisons
map into the empirical findings as follows.
First, eCi > eSCi iff ai < a∗−i; namely, providing rank information reduces effort for
individuals whose ability is lower than their expectation of their peers’ ability. Intuitively,
all other things equal, effort provides them with something undesirable (a precise private
signal of their ranking in the class). This is related to the psychology literature on “self-
handicapping,” which can take the form of withdrawing effort in performance settings where
16This holds regardless of whether i expects others to exert high or low effort. If he chooses high effort
and expects others to do so as well, a low rank in test scores implies a low rank in ability. If he expects
others to choose low effort, a low rank in test scores implies a low rank in ability a fortiori.
17Similarly, Benabou and Tirole (2002) consider a model where agents can manipulate their interim belief
through the choice of information structure. They show that less information can be preferable as it can
weaken the time-inconsistency problem and induce more effort in the future. We do not assume time-
inconsistency in our setting, which would exacerbate our effect as it would further discount the future
impacts of taking distorted actions for interim belief utility.
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there is potential for self-image-damaging feedback (Jones & Berglas, 1978; Berglas, 1985).18
In line with this, a qualitative survey we administered before implementing the treatments
reveals that 43% of the trainees in the bottom quartile of baseline scores did not want to
know their relative rank in the class, while only 24% of those in the top quartile said the
same.
These findings are similar to Oster et al. (2013), in which people at risk for Huntington
Disease prefer not to be undergo a test to learn whether they have the genetic mutation
that causes the disease because the anticipatory utility of believing they might not get sick
outweighs the costs of potentially distorted actions.
Second eAi > eSCi for all i; namely, providing awards in addition to rank information can
only increase effort as long as awards are valuable, since βai pe(ai, eAi , bi)A > 0. The strength
of the effect depends on ability and baseline scores, both of which determine the marginal
return to effort pe(ai, eAi, bi).
Third, eAi > eCi for all i such that ai ≥ a∗−i, as both the second (rank information)
and third (award) term in the first order condition are weakly positive, thus increasing the
marginal return to effort. In contrast, eAi S eCi for all i such that ai < a∗−i since the second
(rank information) term is negative and the third (award) term is positive. Thus, providing
awards might reduce effort compared to the control group that receives no awards or rank
information if the response to rank information is stronger than the response to the award
itself.
5 Conclusion
Our results suggest that awards can have a negative effect on performance as they facilitate
social comparison, even though they have a positive effect through employer recognition and
enhanced social visibility. In our context, the negative effect of rank information on learning
was large enough to undo the positive effects of awards. Since learning is directly related to
future labor productivity, and test scores are significantly predictive of future performance,
18This allows the trainee to manipulate the attribution of failure to himself (Kelley, 1971). If failure occurs,
the extent to which the outcome is attributed to his lack of ability is discounted because of the equally likely
reason for failure: decreased effort. However, if the trainee obtains a high grade on the exam, the attribution
to ability is strengthened because the decreased learning effort made it even more difficult to do well.
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the distortion in effort is practically significant, and detrimental to the objective of increasing
overall learning and later on-the-job productivity.
While the relative magnitudes of these effects are likely to be context-specific, the possible
negative effects of rank information and social comparisons are important to consider in
the overall productivity effects and design of performance awards. In particular, we show
that individuals may even reduce effort in anticipation of learning rank information. This is
consistent with a model in which individuals have preferences over their self-perceived ability
ranking, and thus engage in information avoidance to be able to retain a positive view of
themselves. In effect, they self-sabotage in order to avoid the signal contained in ranking
information so as not to have to update their beliefs about their own relative ability. As the
risk that the signal of low rank is greater in lower ability ranges, this self-handicapping is
worse at the bottom of the distribution.
From an employer or policy maker perspective, the cost of an incentive structure that
differentially affects the lower tail depends on the nature of the production function. It is
particularly costly when there are complementarities in production or when the performance
of the lower tail is critical to the principal’s goal, as in our setting where the government
wants to ensure equitable provision of health services to remote rural areas. In domains
such as innovation in science and finance, the effect on productivity of the upper tail of the
distribution might be most important. But in domains such as health services delivery where
the potential for harm is high, it is critical to employ incentives that are not detrimental to
the lower tail of the distribution. This depends in part, as well, on the ease of exit and entry;
if the goal is to induce the lower tail to withdraw effort, and potentially exit, then providing
rank information could be a highly effective means to do so. It is left to future research to
unbundle these effects across cultures and professional sectors.
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Figure 1: Schematic of Experimental Treatment Conditions.
After each course 
exam, each trainee 
is given a private 
letter that 
indicates his or 
her absolute 
score on the exam 
as well as his or 
her value added 
with respect to his 
or her course sub-
score in the 
baseline exam.
The letter reports 
the trainee’s rank 
within the 
classroom on 
absolute score and 
value added, 
respectively.
The two trainees 
with the highest 
exam score and 
the two trainees 
with the highest 
value added are 
publicly named 
in the letters 
given to all 
trainees within the 
classroom.
The four top-
performing 
trainees are given 
a personalized 
letter from the 
program director 
at the Ministry of 
Health 
congratulating 
them on their 
achievement.
One of the four 
top-performing 
trainees is 
randomly chosen 
to be profiled in a 
newsletter that is 
sent to all of the 
trainees' 
communities of 
origin.
C:
Control ✔
T1:
Private Social Comparison ✔ ✔
T2:
T1 + Public Social Comparison ✔ ✔ ✔
T3:
T2 + Employer Recognition Award ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
T4:
T2 + Social Visibility Award ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
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Table 2: Average Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Teacher 
controls
First exam
Following 
exams
T1: Private Social Comparison -0.308* -0.351** -0.287* -0.322*
(0.161) (0.171) (0.168) (0.194)
T2: T1 + Public Social Comparison -0.379*** -0.409*** -0.456*** -0.324**
(0.145) (0.155) (0.172) (0.156)
T3: T2 + Employer Recognition Award 0.005 -0.044 0.128 -0.080
(0.133) (0.174) (0.165) (0.136)
T4: T2 + Social Visibility Award 0.064 0.122 -0.140 0.112
(0.135) (0.148) (0.165) (0.143)
Net effect of Public Social Comparison (T2-T1) -0.071 -0.058 -0.170 -0.003
(0.166) (0.164) (0.174) (0.201)
Net effect of Employer Recognition Award (T3-T2) 0.384*** 0.365** 0.585*** 0.244*
(0.141) (0.161) (0.175) (0.148)
Net effect of Social Visibility Award (T4-T2) 0 .443*** 0.531*** 0.316* 0.436***
(0.141) (0.151) (0.170) (0.153)
Trainee controls yes yes
Teacher controls no yes
Number of clusters (trainees) 307 307
Number of observations (trainee-courses) 1149 850
Adjusted R-squared 0.213 0.212
307
1149
0.224
p =
p =
p =
p =
p =
0.026
0.458
Notes: Table reports OLS estimates, weighted by course duration, with standard errors clustered at the trainee level in parentheses.
Dependent variable is normalized exam score, normalized by the mean and standard deviation of the control group for each exam.
Trainee controls include: score in the baseline test for each of the four courses, English test score, gender, age, previous experience in
the health sector, employment status at the time of application, district recruitment strategy. Teacher controls include: average teacher
rating and whether at least one of the teachers had specific expertise in the subject matter. Both variables are defined at the course-
treatment level. Columns (2) and (3) report coefficients estimated in the same regression where we include all treatments interacted
with an indicator variable that takes value 0 in the first period and 1 thereafter.
  *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
    ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
      * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Heterogeneous effects by exam period
Test of 
equality
(5)
p =
p =
yes
no
0.844
0.378
0.123
0.087
0.381
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Baseline Test Score
(1) (2) (3)
First tercile of 
baseline test score
Second tercile of 
baseline test score
Third tercile of 
baseline test score
T1: Private Social Comparison -0.672** -0.233 0.010
(0.298) (0.271) (0.213)
T2: T1 + Public Social Comparison -0.812*** -0.179 -0.113
(0.260) (0.199) (0.203)
T3: T2+ Employer Recognition Award -0.280 0.157 -0.005
(0.216) (0.250) (0.159)
T4: T2+Social Visibility Award -0.102 0.204 -0.031
(0.309) (0.223) (0.177)
Net effect of Public Social Comparison (T2-T1) -0.140 0.054 -0.153 
(0.334) (0.243) (0.214) 
Net effect of Employer Recognition Award (T3-T2) 0.532** 0.336  0.107
(0.255) (0.214) (0.166) 
Net effect of Social Visibility Award (T4-T2) 0 .710** 0.383** 0.082
(0.342) (0.183) (0.173)
Trainee controls yes yes yes
Number of clusters (trainees) 92 107 107
Number of observations (trainee-courses) 350 401 398
Adjusted R-squared 0.186 0.079 0.157
Notes: Table reports OLS estimates, weighted by course duration, with standard errors clustered at the trainee level in parentheses.
Dependent variable is normalized exam score, normalized by the mean and standard deviation of the control group for each exam.
Individual controls include: score in the baseline test for each of the four courses, English test score, gender, age, previous experience
in the health sector, employment status at the time of application, district recruitment strategy.
  *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
    ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
      * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 2: Quantile Treatment Effects
Notes: Each line connects treatment effects of each treatment estimated at each decile. Point estimates and standard errors are reported in Table A1.
Individual controls include: score in the baseline test for each of the four courses, English test score, gender, age, previous experience in the health
sector, employment status at the time of application, district recruitment strategy. 
-.8
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Outline of One-year Community Health Assistant Training Curriculum
Course Module Teaching Days Topics 
0 1: Health care 
system in Zambia 
4 • Organization and functions of the health care system in Zambia 
• Roles and responsibilities of a Community Health Assistant 
• Code of conduct 
• Gender equality 
• Community mobilization and networking 
 2: Behavioral 
sciences 
19 • Introduction to psychology 
• Mental health and common psychiatric conditions 
• Introduction to sociology 
• Family and community 
 3: Health 
promotion 
9 • Introduction to health promotion 
• Communication skills 
 4: Environmental 
health  
31 • General principles of infection prevention 
• Water supply 
• Excreta disposal 
• Solid waste management 
• Food hygiene and safety 
• Housing and health 
• Insect and rodent control 
1 5: Epidemiology 34 • Infectious disease epidemiology 
• Epidemic investigation and management 
• Epidemiological surveillance 
• Data collection 
 6: Reproductive 
and child health 
35 • Introduction to reproductive health 
• Introduction to child health 
• School health services 
2 7: Anatomy and 
physiology 
20 • Introduction to the human body 
• Musculoskeletal system 
• Cardiovascular system 
• Respiratory system 
• Digestive system 
• Urinary system 
• Special senses 
3 8: Basic 
procedures 
20 • Occupational safety and health 
• Lifting and moving patients 
• History and physical exam skills 
• Assessment of hygiene, nutrition, physical activity, pain, and vital 
signs 
• Wound care 
• Palliative care 
 9: Common 
medical 
conditions 
38 • Common conditions (malaria, diarrhea, respiratory infection, HIV, 
tuberculosis, anemia, etc.) 
• Oral health 
4 10: Diagnostic 
procedures 
4 • Malaria rapid diagnostic testing 
• HIV testing 
• Sputum collection for TN testing 
 11: First aid 9 • Principles of first aid 
• Bandaging 
• Lifting and moving patients 
• Cardio-pulmonary resuscitation 
• Handling of selected emergencies (toxic ingestion, bites and stings, 
fractures, burns, drowning, foreign body ingestion) 
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Figure A.2: Control Group
 
 
 
Ndola 18th July 2011  
 
 
Dear John Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
• Theoretical: 76% 
• Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
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Figure A.3: Treatment #1
 
 
 
Ndola 18th July 2011  
 
 
Dear John Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
• Theoretical: 76% 
• Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
 
Within your class you were: 
• 3rd out of 60 students on the Theoretical. 
• 13th out of 60 students in terms of most improved from the 
baseline exam.  
 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
All names are fictional.
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Figure A.4: Treatment #2
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Figure A.5: Treatment #3
 
 
 
Ndola 18th July 2011  
 
 
Dear John Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
• Theoretical: 76% 
• Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
 
Within your class you were: 
• 3rd out of 60 students on the Theoretical. 
• 13th out of 60 students in terms of most improved from the 
baseline exam.  
 
 
 
Please note the following top performers: 
 
• Mary Phiri was 1st in this class on Theoretical score. 
• James Mwanza was 2nd in this class on Theoretical score. 
• Peter Mwaba was 1st in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
• Martha Chilima was 2nd in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
Top	  performers	  also	  receive	  
le/er	  from	  MoH	  
John, 
ha Banda 
John Banda was 
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Figure A.6: Treatment #4
 
 
 
Ndola 18th July 2011  
 
 
Dear John Banda, 
 
 
Please find below your scores on the Module 4 exam: 
• Theoretical: 76% 
• Improvement from baseline exam: 20% points improvement (76%-56% 
on baseline exam) 
 
 
 
Within your class you were: 
• 3rd out of 60 students on the Theoretical. 
• 13th out of 60 students in terms of most improved from the 
baseline exam.  
 
 
 
Please note the following top performers: 
 
• Mary Phiri was 1st in this class on Theoretical score. 
• James Mwanza was 2nd in this class on Theoretical score. 
• Peter Mwaba was 1st in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
• Martha Chilima was 2nd in this class on most improved from the 
baseline exam. 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mrs Nyirenda  
Training coordinator   
 
 
 
NDOLA COMMUNITY HEALTH 
ASSISTANT TRAINING SCHOOL 
One	  of	  top	  performers	  also	  
featured	  in	  a	  newsle/er	  sent	  to	  
their	  community	  
Dear Martha Banda, 
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